In National Labor Relations Board v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., No. 16-1385, 2017 WL 2297620 (6th Cir. May 26, 2017), the Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in upholding the NLRB’s decision that barring an employee from pursuing class action or collective claims violates the NLRA. Already lined up on the other side of a growing Circuit split are the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.
In Alternative Entertainment, Inc., the NLRB claimed that language in both the employment contract and the employee handbook used by Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (“AEI”) “violated the NLRA by barring employees from pursuing class-action litigation or collective arbitration of work-related claims.” Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 2017 WL 2297620 at *1.
Joining the Seventh Circuit’s critique of the Fifth Circuit’s logic in D. R. Horton, the Sixth expressly takes on the Fifth stating “the Fifth Circuit started with the wrong question.” When the Sixth asks the question it believes is the right one–if the NLRA is compatible with the FAA–the Court finds them in “harmony” and holds the employer’s ban on concerted action violates the NLRA. As a result, the court found the ban is also unenforceable under the FAA’s saving clause. According to the Sixth, the NLRA bans contracts that interfere with “employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, not because they mandate arbitration.” Any contract provision that interfered in this way would be illegal, which is in full accord with the FAA’s rejection of any contract that “undermine[s] employees’ right to engage in concerted legal activity.”
The Sixth’s second disagreement with the Fifth Circuit is expressed by the Sixth’s use of Chevron deference (arguing in the alternative, after stating there is no statutory ambiguity). The Sixth accepts the NLRB’s permissible construction of the NLRA’s right to concerted activity as a substantive, not procedural right.
In a partial dissent, and referring to the “manifestation of hostility toward arbitration,” Justice Sutton references the history of judicial protection and support of arbitration agreements provided over time. Specifically, the dissent objects to the majority’s overreaching use of Chevron, and states the majority opinion ignores Concepcion’s rejection of similar arguments harmonizing the NLRA with the FAA. (The majority opinion, however, distinguishes the kind of arbitration provision used by AEI and the kind of arbitration provision used by the employer in Concepcion.)
One question here is why would the Sixth Circuit bother drafting and filing this opinion when SCOTUS has already accepted review of this issue? It is possible the Sixth decided to issue this opinion in an effort to intentionally level the sides of this split by adding its voice to the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. It is also possible that since arguments had been heard in November 2016, opinions had already been formed by the time SCOTUS granted cert. on the question in January 2017. Either way, SCOTUS is expected to opine later this year on cases consolidated as National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., which will resolve the growing divide among the circuits. In granting cert., SCOTUS acknowledged the extent of the Circuit split as it existed in January—and footnoted this Sixth circuit case along with four other potential cases from the Third, Fourth, Eleventh and the D.C. Circuits. SCOTUS saw this one coming their way. I look forward to reading the resolution of this split.
ArbitrationNation thanks Jaclyn Schroeder, a law student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law, for researching and drafting this post.