You know what rarely rises to the top of my “to do” list?  Reading scholarly articles and studies about arbitration.  Blech.  But, since I haven’t seen any good court decisions lately, it is time to visit the neglected pile of articles.  Turns out, I should have read some of them right away.  Below are summaries of five new-ish articles that have crossed my desk.  A few offer peeks into arbitration data that is generally not available and some conclusions to chew on over this Thanksgiving holiday.

First is “Arbitration Nation,” an empirical study of 40,775 consumer, employment and tort cases filed with four different arbitration providers between 2010 – 2016 (AAA, JAMS, ADR Services and Kaiser).*   The data came from two sources: public data that the State of California requires arbitration providers to file, as well as a cache of data  gathered by the New York Times.  After reviewing the data, the authors conclude: 1) arbitration is faster that court litigation and generally more affordable for plaintiffs; 2) there was no surge in arbitration filings after the Concepcion decision, but there is evidence of at least a few mass-individual filings (same law firm filing 200 – 1300 individual arbitrations against the same defendant in the same time period); 3) plaintiffs win at a lower rate in arbitration than in court, and pro se plaintiffs “struggle mightily” in arbitration; and 4) the concerns about “repeat-player bias” are “well-founded” — but those repeat players are both defendants who appear often, as well as plaintiffs-side law firms who appear often.  For example, within the JAMS set of data, the authors report that a consumer’s probability of winning increased 79.9% if it was represented by a “super repeat-player” law firm (as compared to appearing pro se), and an employee’s probability of winning increased 55.1% if he was represented by a “high-level” repeat player firm.  (See pp. 42-43.)  Read this article if you: want to compare JAMS and AAA (on cost and speed); want to see data on how Concepcion affected arbitration filings; or want to see statistical evidence of “repeat player” bias.

Second, “Inside the Black Box” reflects findings from surveys of construction arbitrators, advocates, and industry representatives.  Although some of the survey findings just confirmed what most people would expect (like party-appointed arbitrators are not always neutral), there are some unexpected nuggets.  For example, I found it interesting that 68.5% of construction arbitrators report allowing depositions in “regular” sized cases, and 88.9% of arbitrators report allowing them in large, complex cases.  And 75% of arbitrators allow prehearing subpoenas.  Furthermore “advocates prefer more discovery than arbitrators are allowing in … cases in which claims are below $1 million.”  (p. 59)  Furthermore, the authors say “summary judgment motions in construction arbitrations perhaps have been over-criticized.  If a healthy majority of 63.7% of arbitrators found they were useful half the time or more..it is hard to argue their use should be constrained.” (p. 65)  I also like this one: 44.6% of the arbitrators who responded said that evidentiary objections have no impact on their view of the evidence or their deliberations.  So, stop shouting “Objection: hearsay” in arbitration! Read this article if you: are a construction litigator and want to understand the norms in this industry’s arbitration practice.

Third, “Arbitration in the Americas” reports findings from surveys of arbitration “practitioners” across the Americas.  Amusingly, of the 212 U.S. respondents, 60.45% describe legislators as “having a Low or Very Low understanding of arbitration.”  In keeping with the “Arbitration Nation” study above, “U.S. respondents reported that arbitration in the United States is faster than litigation, with 44.32% describing it as Slightly Faster, and a further 43.24% describing it as Much Faster.” (p. 60)  More surprisingly, “U.S. respondents overwhelmingly described arbitration as on average cheaper than litigation, with 49.19% describing it as Slightly Cheaper and a further 22.70% describing it as Much Cheaper.” (61).  Read this article if you want to compare perceptions of how well arbitration works and is supported in this country with perceptions in other countries.

Fourth, “The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration” argues that between 315,000 and 722,000 potential employment arbitrations are “missing in action”.   As the abstract states: “The great bulk of employment disputes that are subject to [mandatory arbitration agreements] simply evaporate before they are ever filed. They are “MIA,” or “missing in arbitration.” That conclusion emerges from a comparison of the tiny number of employment claims that are filed in arbitration with an estimated number of claims one would expect to see given the number of employees who are covered by MAAs and the volume of employment litigation by those who are free to litigate.”  Read this article if you like public policy and are concerned about current SCOTUS jurisprudence.

Fifth, “Running It Twice“, proposes new types of baseball arbitration, in which separate arbitrators (or panels) decide the same dispute to ensure no rogue result.  Read this article if you like shiny new things and sports analogies.

*You didn’t read that wrong; the article’s name is the same as this blog.  I gave them permission.

Happy Thanksgiving all!

There are only four ways to avoid an arbitration agreement.  You can prove: 1)  it was never formed; 2) it was formed, but is invalid under state law; 3) the current dispute is outside the scope of it; or 4) the other party waived their right to arbitrate (through litigation conduct).  Today’s post is about the third method.  Because of the federal presumption in favor of arbitrability, which applies when courts are determining whether the parties’ dispute falls within the scope of the clause, it is not the most common way to evade an arbitration agreement.   Yet, I collected four recent decisions in which courts find the parties’ dispute is not covered by their arbitration agreement.

In Anderson v. Deere & Co., 2018 WL 5262778 (Mont. Oct. 23, 2018), the Montana Supreme Court found that a fight between John Deere Company and the former owner of one of its dealerships was not arbitrable.  The Dealer Agreement had an arbitration clause obligating the Dealer, and its guarantors, officers, and shareholders, to arbitrate “any dispute” “between Dealer and Company.”  The plaintiff signed the Dealer Agreement as managing partner of the Dealer and as guarantor.  Later, the plaintiff sold his interest in the Dealer and sued Deere for tortious interference.  The trial court denied the motion to compel and the supreme court affirmed.  It focused on the language saying arbitrable disputes were those “between Dealer and Company,” and found that because the plaintiff alleged defendant committed torts against him personally, not as part of “Dealer,” there was no obligation to arbitrate.  One judge wrote a special concurrence, disagreeing with the majority’s finding on scope.

In Perez v. DirecTV, 2018 WL 5115531 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2018), the 9th Circuit found the named plaintiff in a putative class action did not have to arbitrate her claims for violations of the Communications Act.  DirecTV’s Customer Agreement with the plaintiff specifically exempted disputes “involving a violation of the Communications Act”.  That sounds fairly straightforward, but one member of the panel dissented, finding the exception was ambiguous and therefore should have been resolved in favor of arbitration.

In Pictet Overseas Inc. v. Helvetia Trust, 2018 WL 4560685 (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2018), the 11th Circuit affirmed a district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims were not arbitrable.  The dispute was between investment trusts whose funds had been stolen, on one hand, and the owners and affiliates of a Swiss Bank on the other.  The trusts started a FINRA arbitration, but the Swiss Bank objected that the claims did not belong in FINRA arbitration.  FINRA Rule 12200 requires FINRA members and associated persons to arbitrate when the dispute “arises in connection with the business activities of the member or the associated person.”  There was no dispute that the Swiss Bank was a FINRA member, but the court had to interpret the meaning of “business activities of ..the associated person.”  The court concluded that “only disputes arising out of business activities of an associated person as an associated person are covered” by the rule and must be arbitrated.  One judge concurred specially, to give further examples of why the rule could not be read the way the trusts advocated.

Finally, in Grand Summit Hotel Condominium United Owners’ Assoc. v. L.B.O. Holding, Inc., 2018 WL 4440370 (N.H. Sept. 18, 2018), the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the claims of condo owners against their property manager were not arbitrable.  The parties’ arbitration agreement provided for decision  by an independent public accountant of disputes over “actual costs” — pass-through costs of operation and maintenance — or management fees.  The court “assume[d] without deciding that the provision is an arbitration clause and that the presumption in favor of arbitrability applies.”  Even so, the court found that the disputes provision was narrow and because the owners did not dispute the Actual Costs, but instead sought damages caused by the manager’s misconduct (in failing to engage anyone to winterize the cooling tower), they were not obligated to arbitrate their claims.

Is this the new arbitration resistance??  Some kind of “scope-a-dope,” in which courts that don’t take kindly to arbitration can hold up their hands and say “I accepted that the arbitration agreement was formed, and that it was valid, but under state contract law, I interpret this claim as outside the scope.”  That is a hard type of case to preempt under federal law, especially if it’s done without announcing a “rule” of contract interpretation.

This post is aimed at drafters of arbitration clauses. Because if you don’t insert an administrator for your arbitration, and don’t anticipate that the administrator may just stop providing services, your arbitration clause is dead in the water. At least, that’s the holding of two new state court cases.

In A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter, 2018 WL 4998256 (Mo. Oct. 16, 2018), the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The reason was that the arbitration agreement within the 2006 loan documents provided “any claim or dispute related to this agreement…shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum [NAF], under the Code of Procedure then in effect.” As regular readers are aware, the NAF stopped administering consumer arbitration in 2009. Although many courts have enforced arbitration agreements, despite their inclusion of NAF, Missouri did not. It found that the language of this clause showed that the parties intended to arbitrate before the NAF and only the NAF. Therefore, the court refused to use Section 5 of the FAA to appoint a replacement administrator.

In Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., Docket No. A-2580-17T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 17, 2018), New Jersey’s appellate division was faced with a slightly different problem: the parties’ arbitration clause did not provide what rules would govern the arbitration nor which entity would administer it.  As a result, the court found the arbitration clause was never formed, because the employee could not give informed assent. It reasoned:

Selecting an arbitral institution informs the parties, at a minimum, about that institution’s arbitration rules and procedures.  Without knowing this basic information, parties to an arbitration agreement will be unfamiliar with the rights that replaced judicial adjudication.  That is, the parties will not reach a “meeting of the minds.”

While clarifying that no magic words were required, the New Jersey court noted that if the parties don’t identify an “arbitral institution (such as AAA or JAMS)” they should at least identify the process for selecting a forum.  Otherwise, arbitration agreements will not be enforced under New Jersey law. (Unlike Missouri, the New Jersey court did not discuss Section 5 of the FAA and the statutory authority for courts to appoint arbitrators.)

Every time I think the spate of state supreme court opinions about nursing home arbitration surely must be over, another one comes out to prove me wrong.  Last week, it was one from Alabama, finding an arbitration agreement was never formed, because the resident lacked capacity and the daughter who signed on his behalf lacked power of attorney.

In Stephan v. Millennium Nursing & Rehab Ctr., 2018 WL 4846501 (Ala. Oct. 5, 2018), the decedent’s estate sued the nursing home for wrongful death.  The nursing home moved to compel arbitration.  The trial court granted the motion to compel, and the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed.

The decedent’s daughter had signed the admission paperwork in a space provided for “signature of family member responsible for patient.”  She did not have power of attorney or any other legal authority to contract in his name.  (She also happened to be personal representative of his estate.)  In reviewing the record, the court found decedent was incapable of entering into a contract on the date of the admission documents due to his dementia.  In addition, the decedent could not have understood the effect of allowing his daughter to agree to arbitrate, so she lacked apparent authority.  Furthermore, the daughter was not personally bound to the arbitration clause, and thereby precluded from suing as personal representative, because she signed in her capacity as her father’s relative, not in her own capacity.   Therefore, the arbitration agreement never existed and could not be enforced.

One justice dissented, arguing that the daughter essentially fraudulently induced the nursing home to contract.

Here’s the key question: Is this ruling preempted by the FAA, or does it otherwise run afoul of Kindred?  I don’t think so.  Kindred involved an actual power of attorney document.  This case seems to rest on principles that most states would agree with, and would apply generally to contracts of other types.  SCOTUS is also unlikely to be interested in this case since Alabama has generally been following federal precepts about arbitration.

I would understand if not every state supreme court got the memo from last year’s SCOTUS decision on FAA preemption, Kindred, which reminded state courts that the FAA prevents state courts from imposing additional requirements on arbitration agreements that are not required for other types of contracts.  But Kentucky definitely got the memo.  The memo was addressed to Kentucky. Yet, last week the Supreme Court of Kentucky released a new decision that continues to convey hostility to arbitration and SCOTUS’s decisions interpreting the FAA.

The legal issue in Northern Ky. Area Development District v. Snyder, 2018 WL 4628143 (Ky. Sept. 27, 2018) is straightforward: Does the FAA preempt a Kentucky statute that prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an employee’s agreement to arbitrate claims.  The statute prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to “waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would otherwise be entitled.”  In this case, the plaintiff was required to sign an arbitration agreement in order to work for the governmental entity.  When she sued over her termination, the employer moved to compel arbitration.

The trial court refused to compel arbitration.  Then the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the employer never had authority to enter into the arbitration in the first place (due to the statute), so the arbitration agreement did not technically exist.  (Too cute by half.  Plus, Justice Kagan specifically said that formation issues could also be preempted.)

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.  It also concluded that the employer, a state agency, was covered by the anti-arbitration statute.  And therefore, when it conditioned employment on an agreement to arbitrate, in violation of the statute, its action was “ultra vires,” and the resulting arbitration agreement was void.  (See parenthetical above.)

The court went on to find the anti-arbitration statute at issue was not preempted by the FAA.  The decision states with an apparently straight face that the statute “does not actually attack, single out, or specifically discriminate against arbitration agreements” and did not “evidenc[e] hostility to arbitration”.  The statute “simply prevents [the employer] from conditioning employment” on the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, it notes that the statute does not just preclude arbitration agreements, but also any agreement that waives or limits an employee’s rights.

BUT HERE’S THE PROBLEM.  Kentucky’s reasoning only makes sense if we agree that arbitration is a limitation or a diminishment of the employee’s rights.  If, instead, you assume that arbitration is simply an alternative forum for resolving the employee’s full set of rights, the logic falls apart.  But, will SCOTUS really want to hear another Kentucky decision?  Kentucky is betting that it won’t.  Maybe this should not surprise anyone; Kentucky did not exactly bend to SCOTUS’s will when Kindred was remanded.  And btw, the nursing home is seeking certiorari from the remand decision, and SCOTUS just relisted it, meaning it still has a chance. (For good measure, Kentucky’s high court issued a decision compelling arbitration on the same day, overruling an objection that the arbitration clause was not fully mutual.  Grimes v. GHSW Enterprises, 2018 WL 4628160 (Ky. Sept. 27, 2018).)

————————–

Speaking of SCOTUS, Monday it denied cert in at least four arbitration cases.  Two were companion cases (from Cal. and Neb.) that sought guidance on what types of challenges can invalidate a delegation clause.  (My blog post here, SCOTUSblog here and here.)  Another presented issues regarding binding non-signatories to arbitration through equitable estoppel. The fourth involved a question of whether an employer waived its right to arbitration (Cash Biz).  (My post here, filings here.)

And – this morning, SCOTUS hears arguments in New Prime, addressing the exemption in FAA Section One.

[Thanks to @PerryCooper for alerting me to a few of these cert denials.]

The First Circuit just faced a fascinating formation issue: if a customer cannot see what she is signing, and no employee reads it to her or ensures she knows there are legal terms, is there a contract?  With Justice Souter sitting by designation on the panel, the court answered “no,” and thereby kept a class action in the courts. National Federation of the Blind v. The Container Store, Inc., 2018 WL 4378174 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 2018).

The Container Store case involves blind plaintiffs who allege the retailer violated discrimination laws by failing to use tactile keypads on its point-of-sale (POS) devices.  In response, the retailer moved to compel individual arbitration for the plaintiffs who had enrolled in a loyalty program (which has an arbitration agreement and class action waiver).  The customers who enrolled in the loyalty program in a store alleged that they enrolled with the assistance of a sales associate, and were never presented with the terms and conditions of the program, including the arbitration provision.   In response, the retailer presented excerpts from a training manual, which instructed employees to give blind plaintiffs the opportunity to review the terms on the POS device.  Critically, the retailer did not have evidence that the employee who helped sign up the named plaintiffs had in fact read the terms and conditions to those plaintiffs or otherwise made them aware that there were any terms and conditions.  Therefore, the district court found no agreement to arbitrate was formed between the Container Store and those plaintiffs, and denied the motion to compel arbitration.

On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed.  It first disagreed with the Container Store’s argument that this dispute was one about the validity of the loyalty agreement as a whole, such that it must be heard by an arbitrator.  Instead, it concluded that this was a fundamental dispute about the formation of the arbitration agreement, which was properly addressed by the court.  (The First Circuit even got punny:  “We reject the Container Store’s attempt to re-package Plaintiffs’ arguments as one regarding validity…”)

It then got into the guts of the argument.  It affirmed the critical findings of the district court: “it is undisputed that the in-store plaintiffs had no way of accessing the terms of the loyalty program, including the arbitration agreement”; and “No store clerk actually informed them that an arbitration agreement existed as a condition of entering the loyalty program.”  Therefore, even though “inability to read” is not generally a defense to contract formation, the court found no arbitration agreement was ever formed with these plaintiffs.  Unlike other situations where plaintiffs who could not read knew or should have known that they were signing documents that implicated legal rights, in this case the court found “zero hint” that the loyalty program involved terms and conditions.

Finally, with respect to a class of plaintiffs who had signed up for the loyalty program online, and thereby did have notice of the terms and conditions, the court still denied the motion to arbitrate.  It found the arbitration agreement was illusory and therefore unenforceable under Texas law.  The court found language in the arbitration agreement gave the Container Store “the right to alter the terms of the loyalty program, including the arbitration provision, ‘at any time'” and the change would have retroactive effect, affecting even parties who had already invoked arbitration.

This case reminds me of the First Circuit’s big decision in Uber  in June, when the court found that the arbitration agreement in Uber’s terms also was not conspicuous enough to be binding.  In other words, this issue is not limited to individuals who have disabilities, but gets at the fundamental question of how much information do consumers need to validly form a contract.

This case also makes me smile because guess which firm represented the Container Store?  Sheppard Mullin, the same firm that was not able to enforce its own arbitration agreement with its client in the last post.   Rough arbitration month for those attorneys.

 

In today’s post I recount an epic battle between the Rules of Professional Conduct (tagline: saving clients from unscrupulous lawyers for over 100 years!) and the Uniform Arbitration Act (tagline: saving arbitration from hostile judges for 60 years!) in the Supreme Court of California.  Spoiler alert: the Rules of Professional Conduct win.

The story in Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., 2018 WL 4137103 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2018), begins with a “large law firm” [ed: with too many names] taking over the defense of J-M in a qui tam action in federal court in March of 2010.  The problem was that one of the public entities that had been identified as a real party in interest in the qui tam case was also a client of the firm (for employment matters).  Because both clients had signed engagement letters with general language waiving potential conflicts, the firm concluded it could take on the qui tam action.

The SMRH firm defended J-M for just one year before its employment client moved to disqualify it.  In that time, the firm had put in 10,000 hours defending J-M, and was still owed over one million dollars in fees.  The district court disqualified the firm based on the firm’s failure to adequately inform the employment client and J-M of the adversity before obtaining waivers, as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.

At that point, the law firm sought its million dollars of unpaid fees from J-M in a state court action, and J-M in turn sought disgorgement of the two million dollars it had already paid.  The law firm successfully moved to compel arbitration, with the trial court dismissing J-M’s argument that the conflict of interest made the whole contract illegal and unenforceable. (And, the Court of Appeals refused a discretionary review which could have avoided the wasted fees of the arbitration.)

A panel of arbitrators awarded the law firm more than $1.3 million.  The parties were then back in state court with cross-motions to confirm and vacate the award.  The trial court confirmed the award.  However, the Court of Appeal reversed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of California agreed that the arbitration award must be vacated.  It rested its decision on precedent from 1949, noting that “an agreement to arbitrate is invalid and unenforceable if it is made as part of a contract that is invalid and unenforceable because it violates public policy.”  In this case, the court found that the Rules of Professional Conduct were an expression of public policy, such that a violation of those rules could render an arbitration agreement void.  And it also found that the firm’s failure to give both of its clients notice of the actual adversity, and obtain informed consent of the representation, was a violation that tainted the entire contract and made it illegal.  (For you ethics geeks, the rule violated was 3-310(C)(3).)

Because the contract between the law firm and J-M was unenforceable, the court found the firm was “not entitled to the benefit of the arbitrators’ decision” and the parties could resume “where they were before the case took its unwarranted detour to arbitration.”  (Not sure why the court refused to say it was vacating the arbitration award.)  But, don’t shed too many tears for the lawyers.  The law firm will be able to argue in the trial court regarding whether it is entitled to any of its fees under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit.  (Two judges dissented from that last part, finding that the ethical conflict should prevent the firm from recovering at all.)

I leave it to other blogs to discuss the ethical issues for lawyers present here, and to therapists and firm counsel to address the rising panic that lawyers may feel when reading this opinion.  For my purpose, this case is further demonstration that the type of arbitration agreement that is most susceptible to arguments of invalidity is the one between an attorney and client.  (Recall the recent decision in Maine.)  It is also interesting in that it does not discuss whether J-M “waived” its objection to arbitrability at all by participating in the arbitration, indeed there is no discussion of whether or how often J-M raised its objection during the arbitration.  That is a sharp contrast to the rule cited by the 9th Circuit in the Asarco decision (summarized last post), and an example of how inconsistent the rules are regarding waiver.

I have saved up six opinions that considered whether to vacate an arbitration award over the summer.*  Only one of those opinions vacated the award; the other five confirmed.  To get a flavor of what types of arguments are winning and losing motions to vacate, here is a summary of those six.

Vacated

The lone vacatur came in Hebbronville Lone Star Rentals, LLC v. Sunbelt Rentals Industrial Services, LLC, 2018 WL 3719682 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018). The issue in that case was whether the arbitrator exceeded his power by reforming the parties’ contract.  Sunbelt had purchased the assets of Lone Star, and agreed to later pay earnouts based on the post-sale revenue from Lone Star’s customers.  The asset purchase agreement provided that disputes over the amount of earnouts would be decided by the parties “jointly [selecting] the Accounting Firm to resolve any remaining dispute over Seller’s proposed adjustments…which resolution will be final.”  (If that doesn’t sound like an arbitration clause to you, be sure to read this post.)   A dispute arose over whether the revenues from certain Lone Star customers exceeded a target number established in the agreement.  The parties submitted that dispute to an accounting firm.

The arbitrator found that Sunbelt should have included the revenue of two additional customers, which would have resulted in a payment to Lone Star of $6.4M.  However, the arbitrator also concluded that the parties made a mutual mistake in calculating the target number in the agreement, and if the corrected target number was used, Lone Star was actually entitled to nothing.  Lone Star moved to vacate the portion of the arbitrator’s award that reformed the target amount based on mutual mistake.  The district court granted the vacatur, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Oddly, the opinion is not framed in terms of vacatur at all; it does not reference Section 10(a) of the FAA.  Instead, the opinion framed the question as “who decides” the question of mutual mistake.  The court interpreted the language of the parties’ arbitration clause and found it too narrow to encompass the mutual mistake issue.  Therefore, that issue was remanded to the district court for determination.  (Also odd is the absence of any discussion of waiver in this opinion.   My sense is if the arbitrator had been a lawyer instead of a CPA, the analysis may have been quite different.)

Confirmed

The courts found the arguments for vacatur insufficient in five other cases:

  • In another case regarding earnout payments after an asset purchase, an accountant/arbitrator was appointed to hear the seller’s claim that the buyer was manipulating sales to ensure no earnout was owed.  DFM Investments, LLC v. Brandspring Solutions, LLC, 2018 WL 3569353 (8th Cir. July 25, 2018).  After reviewing documents and hearing arguments, the arbitrator found the seller not entitled to any revisions.  The seller moved to vacate, arguing the arbitrator had refused to consider material evidence.  The district court and Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting that the arbitrator concluded the additional evidence was not material.  “An arbitrator’s reasoned decision to forgo analyzing additional evidence does not, without more, provide grounds for vacating the decision.”
  • In a case that reminds all advocates to carefully preserve objections, the Ninth Circuit confirmed an award because the complaining party did not properly preserve its objection. Asarco LLC v. United Steel, 2018 WL 3028692 (9th Cir. June 19, 2018).  Like in Sunbelt, the issue was whether the arbitrator had the power to reform the parties’s labor agreement based on mutual mistake, despite a provision in the contract depriving the arbitrator of “authority to add to, detract from or alter in any way the provisions of” the contract.  The district court concluded the arbitrator had authority to reform the labor agreement.  The Ninth Circuit found Asarco had conceded the issue by arguing the arbitrator lacked authority, instead of preserving that issue for the courts by refusing to address jurisdiction with the arbitrator (0r seeking injunctive relief at the outset).  (Wow – what a harsh rule.)  Even so, the court analyzed the merits and found the arbitrator had authority to reform the agreement.  However, one dissenting judge wrote that he would vacate the award based on the arbitrator exceeding the scope of his powers.
  • In another case from the Eighth Circuit, the court refused to vacate an arbitration award, even though the arbitration award was nearly three times the contractual liability limit.  Beumer Corp. v. Proenergy Services, 2018 WL 3767135 (8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2018).  The arbitrator found the provision limiting damages to the “Contract Sum” was enforceable, but that attorneys fees and interest did not count as “damages” for the purpose of that provision.  The court found that, even if the arbitrator had overlooked Missouri decisions finding attorneys fees count as damages, it did not matter because manifest disregard of the law is not a valid basis to vacate an award.
  • Speaking of “manifest disregard,” Maryland’s high court took the opportunity to clarify that it lives on as a basis for vacating awards under Maryland’s Uniform Arbitration Act.  WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Assoc., 2018 WL 3629441 (Md. July 30, 2018).  However, the arbitrator in Trio did not manifestly disregard the law, because he did not make “a palpable mistake of law or fact appearing on the face of the award.”  In fact, the arbitrator identified relevant principles of Maryland law, analyzed the parties’ contract, and issued damages that were “reasonably consistent” with principles of Maryland law.
  • Finally, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island confirmed an arbitration award, despite allegations that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, in Prospect Chartercare LLC v. Conklin, 2018 WL 2945664 (R.I. June 13, 2018).  The arbitrator awarded 18 months of severance to an executive employee, and the employer moved to vacate the award based on the arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law by relying on “erroneous facts” and disregarding the contract language.  On appeal, the high court noted that even if the arbitrator had based his decision on a factual error, “such a mistake would not be a proper basis upon which to vacate the arbitration award.”  Furthermore, the arbitrator’s award was based upon a “passably plausible interpretation” of the parties’ agreement.

 

* There were more than six judicial opinions on whether to confirm an arbitration award over the summer, of course.  I focus on federal appellate courts (circuits and SCOTUS) as well as the highest court of each state.

Today’s post concerns a perennially hot topic: class actions.  In particular, do courts decide whether an arbitration agreement allows for class actions?  Or do arbitrators?  (Because, it turns out, there are actually some corporations who have not inserted class action waivers in their consumer contracts.)  To date, four circuit courts have held that class arbitrability is an issue that is presumably for courts (not arbitrators) to decide, even if the parties incorporate rules that generally delegate issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator (3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th).  In recent weeks, the Tenth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit disagreed.  Because the Second Circuit had also previously disagreed, there is now a 4-3 split among the circuits over whether the incorporation of AAA (or similar) rules is sufficient to authorize an arbitrator to decide whether arbitration can proceed on a class-wide basis.

In Spirit Airlines v. Maizes, 2018 WL 3866335 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018), members of Spirit Airlines’ “$9 Fare Club” started a class arbitration with the AAA.  Spirit then brought an action to federal court, seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause did not authorize class arbitration.  (You may recall that the outcome of the Stolt-Nielsen and Sutter cases is that there can be no class arbitration unless the parties agreed to that process in their arbitration clause, but the language does not have to be explicit.)  The district court found that the arbitrator should determine the issue of whether a class action could proceed in arbitration.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that no special rules apply to class arbitration.  It assumed that class arbitration is a gateway issue of arbitrability, such that the court has presumptive authority to decide it.  Here, the Spirit agreement called for the AAA rules, which the court found included the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, and those supplementary rules empower an arbitrator to decide whether claimants may proceed as a class action.  The court found that incorporation of AAA rules was clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended the arbitrator to decide the availability of a class action in arbitration.  It relied on earlier precedent finding that AAA rules are sufficient to delegate jurisdictional issues to arbitrators, and disagreed that SCOTUS rulings provide for any different outcome in the case of class arbitration.

In Dish Network v. Ray, 2018 WL 3978537 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018), a former employee of Dish Network started a class and collective arbitration with the AAA.  The appointed arbitrator issued a Clause Construction Award, finding that he had authority to decide the issue and that the arbitration agreement permitted a collective action.  The arbitrator’s award included ten pages of analysis interpreting the text of the arbitration agreement to shed light on whether they agreed to allow class/collective actions in arbitration.  The district court denied Dish’s motion to vacate the Clause Construction Award, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision.

On appeal, the court assumed without deciding that the availability of class arbitration is a gateway dispute for court to decide.  Even so, it found that the parties’ selection of AAA rules to govern the arbitration was sufficient to clearly and unmistakably delegate the issue of class arbitration to the arbitrator.  It acknowledged that four circuits had “require[d] more specific language delegating the question of class wide arbitrability,” but noted that the Second Circuit had disagreed with that holding earlier this year.  Following the lead of the Second Circuit, the court relied on precedent from Colorado and the Tenth Circuit finding that incorporation of AAA rules is sufficient to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Having concluded that the arbitrator had authority to determine whether the parties’ arbitration agreement allowed for class/collective actions, the court had little trouble finding that the arbitrator’s Clause Construction Award could not be vacated.  The court found that the arbitrator “interpreted the parties’ contract, which is all we are allowed to consider” and did not manifestly disregard the law.

The fact that this circuit split is heating up is interesting in light of one of the arbitration cases that SCOTUS will hear on October 29.  That case, Lamps Plus, presents the question of how specific the language of an arbitration agreement must be in order to authorize class arbitration.

_______________________________

A class action postscript.

A putative class of plaintiffs sued Bluestem Brands in federal court in Minnesota for claims related to its credit programs.  In response to a motion to compel arbitration, the district court compelled arbitration of some claims, but denied others, finding they fell outside the scope of the credit agreement’s arbitration clause.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found all claims fell within the arbitration clause.  Parm v. Bluestem Brands, 2018 WL 3733424 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2018).  After finding the arbitration clause was “broad” (because it used the magic phrase “arise out of”), it found the factual allegations for all claims “touch[ed] matters covered by the arbitration agreement,” because all allegations related to the financing agreements.

And, in further fallout from Epic Systems, roughly 1600 employees of Kelly Services alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in federal court.  Gaffers v. Kelly Services, 2018 WL 3863422 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018).  Kelly Services compelled individual arbitration with the employees who had arbitration agreements (about half).  As those employees’ only defense was that the Federal Arbitration Act should take a backseat to the FLSA or NLRA, the employees lost on appeal and will have to arbitrate.

Arbitration Nation is seven years old, and has 330 posts under its belt (and no seven year itch).  Hip hip hooray!  One of those posts is a perennial favorite, coming up over and over in search results: When Should You Choose JAMS, AAA or CPR Rules?  Because that comparison is five years old, we give you an update.  Here is a chart comparing the three sets of commercial rules on important topics.  Fair warning: the rules are very similar.  So, we added an asterisk in the first column to indicate an issue where there is some difference among the administrators.

Comparison of Popular Arbitration Rules in U.S.

Rule/Topic

Commercial Arbitration Rules – AAA

(Oct. 1, 2013)

JAMS Comprehensive Rules & Procedures

(July 1, 2014)

CPR Administered Arbitration Rules (July 1, 2013)
Filing Fee for $1,000,000 Claim * $8,475 For a two-party matter: $1,500 initial filing fee paid by the party initiating the arbitration and $1,500 for counterclaims. For matters involving three or more parties: $2,000. After that, a case management fee of 12% is assessed against all professional fees charged by arbitrator(s).

Non-refundable filing fee: $1,750

Admin Fee: $7,250

Deadline for Filing Answer/Response to Claim Within fourteen days after respondent receives notice of claim. Within fourteen days after respondent receives notice of claim. Within twenty days after the Respondent receives notice of claim from CPR.
Time to Hearing * None specified None specified The dispute should in most circumstances be submitted to the tribunal within six months after the initial pre-conference.

Number of Arbitrators *

(if not specified in arbitration agreement or agreed upon by parties)

If claim or counterclaim is under $1,000,000, the dispute will be heard by one arbitrator. If it is above that, then three arbitrators shall determine the case. The dispute will be heard by one arbitrator. The dispute will be heard by three arbitrators.
Mediation “Required” * In all cases where a claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, during the time that the arbitration is pending, the parties shall mediate their dispute, unless one or both parties opts out.

Not required; however, the Parties may agree, at any stage of the Arbitration process, to submit the case to JAMS for mediation.

 

Not required, however, the arbitrator may request CPR to arrange for mediation by a mediator acceptable to the parties.
Modification of Rules Parties may modify rules or procedures by written agreement. However, after appointing an arbitrator, such modifications require the consent of the arbitrator. Parties may modify rules as long as modification is legal and consistent with JAMS policies. Parties must notify JAMS and shall confirm the modifications in writing. Modifications are allowed; however, the parties must agree in writing to such modifications during the course of the arbitral proceeding.

 

 

Authority to Determine Jurisdiction

The arbitrator has the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. The arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues, including the existence, scope, and validity of an arbitration agreement, as a preliminary matter. The tribunal has the power to hear and determine challenges to its jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.
Discovery * For cases of all sizes, the arbitrator manages the exchange of information “with a view to achieving an efficient and economic resolution of the dispute, while … safeguarding each party’s opportunity to fairly present its claims and defenses.” Cases with claims under $1,000,000 contemplate just document exchange, while those with claims exceeding $1,000,000 clarify that the arbitrator has discretion to order depositions “upon good cause shown.” For cases of all size, the parties are expected to exchange all relevant ESI and documents within 21 days after pleadings are filed.   In addition, each party may take one deposition of an opposing party. Empowers the tribunal to facilitate “such discovery as it shall determine is appropriate,” but must take into account the needs of the party and the desirability of making discovery efficient and cost effective.
Dispositive Motions The moving party must show that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case. The arbitrator may permit summary disposition of a particular claim or issue, either by agreement of all interested parties or at the request of one party, provided such other interested parties are given reasonable notice to respond.

There is no specific rule regarding summary disposition.

However, the CPR has provided guidelines outlining principles & procedures that note dispositive motions are appropriate when a requesting party can demonstrate that early disposition of any factual or legal issue may be accomplished efficiently and fairly, or when all parties agree that early disposition of a particular issue would be desirable.

Emergency Relief and

Interim Protection

Before an arbitrator is appointed, a party may seek emergency relief and an emergency arbitrator will be appointed within one business day, and a schedule established within two business days.

The (regular) arbitrator may take whatever interim measures he or she deems necessary for the protection or conservation of property.

Before an arbitrator is appointed, a party can seek emergency relief and an Emergency Arbitrator will be appointed within 24 hours, and a schedule established within two days.

The (regular) arbitrator may grant whatever interim measures are deemed necessary, including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property.

Before the tribunal is constituted, any party can request that an interim/emergency measure of protection be granted by a special arbitrator. The arbitrator will be appointed within one business day and shall conduct the proceedings “as expeditiously as possible.”

The (regular) panel may take any interim measures as the tribunal deems necessary to preserve assets or property.

 

Default Award Does not allow the arbitrator to render an award solely on the basis of default or absence of a party. Does not allow the arbitrator to render an award solely on the basis of default or absence of a party. The arbitration will proceed even if the Respondent fails to file a timely notice of defense. The tribunal is empowered to make an award on default; however, such award may only be made after the production of evidence and supporting legal arguments by the non-defaulting party.
Confidentiality * None JAMS and the Arbitrator are required to maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding and the award, including the hearing, unless disclosure is necessary e.g. in connection with a judicial challenge or otherwise required by law. Unless otherwise agreed, the parties and the arbitrators shall treat the proceedings and related discovery as confidential, unless disclosure is necessary i.e. a judicial challenge or if required by law or to protect the legal right of a party.
Authority to Grant Relief

The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable, and within the specific scope of the agreement of parties (e.g. specific performance of a contract).

The arbitrator may apportion the arbitration fees and expenses among the parties, and may award attorneys’ fees if all parties requested such an award or it is authorized by the arbitration agreement or law.

In determining the relief to be granted, the arbitrator should be guided by the rules of law agreed upon by the parties and the rules of law and equity that he or she deems most appropriate.

The arbitrator may allocate arbitration fees and arbitrator compensation, unless the parties’ agreement precludes that. The arbitrator also may award attorneys’ fees if provided by the parties’ agreement or applicable law.

The Tribunal may grant any remedy or relief, including but not limited to specific performance of a contract, which is within the scope of the agreement of the parties and permissible under the law(s) or rules of law applicable to the dispute.

Unless the parties’ agreement precludes it, the Tribunal may also allocate the costs of arbitration, including attorneys’ fees, in such manner as it deems reasonable.

Award Deadline Thirty days after the end of hearings, or if hearings are waived thirty days after arbitrator receives all of materials by the parties. Thirty days after the end of hearings, or if hearings are waived thirty days after arbitrator receives all of materials by the parties. Thirty days after the end of hearings; however, as long as the tribunal must only use “best efforts” to comply with this requirement.

Arbitration Nation thanks Haaris Pasha, a law student at the University of Minnesota, for contributing to this post.